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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary provides a summary of
prevailing environmental decisions decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit since the last
issue of the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review. It does not cover every environmental decision of the
Fourth Circuit during that time period, but only those cases
which the editors believe to be of the most interest to our
subscribers.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
United States v. Jarrell, No. 95-5718, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31006 (4th
Cir. Dec. 3, 1996).
Donald Jarrell appealed the decision by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sentencing him to thirty
months imprisonment. He alleged that the trial court misapplied the
sentencing guidelines involving the mishandling of environmental pollutants.
Jarrell was charged in a seven-count indictment for attempting to conceal
repeated discharges of fecal coliform pollutants into public waters which
polluted nearby residential neighborhoods. Jarrell's waste water operating
permit allowed only 400 parts of fecal coliform per 100 milliliters of waste
water. Samples of waste water taken in a nearby residential neighborhood by
the EPA contained as much as 830,000 parts per 100 milliliters. Jarrell pled
guilty to the third count of the charge which accused him of illegally
discharging a pollutant above the level permitted by a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.
Section 2Q1.3 of the sentencing guidelines establishes the base and
specific offense levels applicable to the defendant's actions. The
commentary to the guidelines permits the trial judge to enhance or reduce a
defendant's specific offense level upon consideration of relevant factors such
as the resulting harm from the discharge, the amount and type of pollutant,
and the associated risk. In the present case, the trial court adjusted Jarrell's
offense level with two 2-point increases. The district court made clear in its
opinion that the nature and seriousness of the offense justified each
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enhancement the court included. On appeal, Jarrell contended that the
increases were unjustified and unreasonable.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, stating that Jarrell's
egregious violations were not so minor as to compel the court to hold that the
district court abused its discretion. The court further stated that, in
determining the applicable specific offense characteristic, a court may
consider "'all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,"' as if they
were grouped as multiple counts. The court held that prior actions similar to
Jarrell's current conviction for discharging toxic substances should be
grouped together for determining the offense level. Therefore, even though
Jarrell was convicted of only one discharge violation, the court determined
that the other discharges for which he did not plead guilty could be
considered relevant for the purpose of establishing the applicable specific
offense characteristic.
Jarrell also appealed the use of his 1975 state arson conviction in
determining his criminal history. He finished serving his term in 1979.
Jarrell claimed that since his present offense occurred more than fifteen years
after the arson, the former offense should not be counted. The court found
that for purposes of determining when the fifteen-year statutory period should
run, the court should look at the earliest relevant conduct, which the court
determined was the 1992 conduct of count four of the indictment. Since the
court had already determined that Jarrell's actions could be grouped together,
the court found that the prior offense was properly counted and that the
district court's calculation of Jarrell's criminal history was correct.
OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Arch Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, No. 95-2793, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 676
(4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1997).
Arch Mineral Corporation ("Arch") instituted this action in the
Southern District of West Virginia, seeking to have itself declared as not an
owner or controller of Greendale Coals, Incorporated ("Greendale").
Greendale had mined coal in West Virginia under a mineral lease with a
subsidiary of the Diamond Shamrock Coal Company. When Greendale
experienced financial troubles in the 1980's, it was unable to pay abandoned
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mine reclamation fees that had been assessed by the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM"), a branch of the Department of the
Interior. When the fees went unpaid, OSM imposed additional penalties.
Shortly thereafter, Greendale went bankrupt and was dissolved under state
law in.1987. Later that same year, Arch purchased Diamond Shamrock.
Under regulations promulgated in 1988, OSM sought to link Arch to
Greendale as an owner or controller using Diamond Shamrock's earlier
mineral lease with Greendale. If this link could be made, it would allow
OSM to block Arch from obtaining new mining pennits or to revoke current
permits and to list Arch on the Applicant/Violator System ("AVS"). After
OSM notified Arch that Arch was presumed to be linked to Greendale
through the ownership and control regulations, Arch responded with
information attempting to rebut that presumption. OSM replied, stating that
the presumption had not been rebutted by Arch's response, and that without
additional response, Arch would be entered into the AVS system. Arch sued
in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent this
link. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch, and Bruce
Babbitt, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior, appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the following grounds.
First, OSM claimed that Arch's statute of limitations defense initiated
at the trial court was an attack on the regulations, and therefore jurisdiction
should have been exclusive to the District Court for the District of Columbia.
The court of appeals rejected OSM's claim that jurisdiction was improper.
The court found that Arch's claim that the statute of limitations had run
involved only the application of the ownership and control regulations and
not the merits of the case. Therefore it concluded that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia properly exercised
subject matter jurisdiction in hearing the case.
Second, OSM attacked the ripeness of the claim. The court of appeals
found the case to be ripe for judicial review. The court determined that
OSM's last correspondence with Arch, stating that without additional rebuttal
evidence, OSM would presume Arch to be controller of Greendale and list
Arch on the AVS, was a final action sufficient for judicial review. The court
stated that Arch's listing on the AVS was a "foregone conclusion, simply a
formality," and that if listed, Arch would suffer punitive consequences as a
result. Therefore, the court held that the controversy was ripe for review.
Finally, the court held that the statute of limitations barred OSM from
"permit-blocking" Arch. The court determined that the OSM actions against
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Arch constituted penalties stemming from Greendale's actions approximately
seven years earlier. The court found that the accrual date of the action was
1986 and because OSM took action against Arch in 1993, the civil penalties
sought by OSM were time barred by the five-year statute of limitations
period. Therefore the court affirmed the findings of the lower court.
